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THE SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION OF PEACE RESEARCH
TO THE STUDY OF THE CAUSES OF VIOLENCE: TYPOLOGIES

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T Y P O L O G I E S

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1. Introduction

Given the significance of violence relative to, say, drosophila melanogaster (the banana fly) it is surprising how little work has been done on even such an elementary part of scientific activity as typology-formation. There may be some reasons for this, to be explored later, but it has at least not happened to the present author to encounter any pair of researchers in the field using the same definitions. There is not even any single tradition that has crystallized as the dominant one, with others competing for recognition - the field is almost unexplored. This, however, may also be a great advantage since it leaves the field fairly open; it can be subdivided in a way that may serve to conceptualize significant phenomena of our times without prejudging them through the use of outmoded typologies.

But even if there is no typology of violence immediately available and generally agreed upon there are at least some rules about "typology-formation, or classification," which we take to be synonymous terms. In general, a typology should establish clear rules as to what is included and what is not in the set in which the typology is to be defined, and then proceed to divide the set into a set of subsets so that the subsets are

- exhaustive (of the set)
- mutually exclusive
- based on a fundamentum divisionis

If the typology is based on the first two principles it is defined in extension only, if the third principle is also respected it is in addition defined in intension: there is a meaning to the division into subsets.

This means that there are, in a sense, three tasks to be done: a relatively clear concept of violence has to be established; some meaningful dimension has to be introduced into this set establishing sub-sets, and finally, more trivially, one should check that all things referred to as "violence" according to the definition

fall into one and only one of these sub-sets. The tasks do not necessarily have to be carried out in that order - it may pay to reflect first on what that dimension could possibly be and then use some intuitions in that direction to build up a corresponding definition of violence, then back to the dimension again, revising it and so on, in some kind of hermeneutical circle.

So much for general methodology. The question then becomes: what would we like a typology of violence to do for us? Here are some perspectives on the possible answer to that question: a good typology of violence should

- (1) conceptualize violence in a way which brings under the concept of violence phenomena that have something very important in common, yet are sufficiently disparate to make the classification (at least in some cases) non-trivial.
- (2) sub-divide violence along a dimension that is theoretically important in the theory of violence, permitting us to say something not only about the differences between the types, but also about the relations between the types.

These two criteria are related. For imagine we are interested in building a theory of violence. One basic and highly legitimate question would be, "What is the cause of violence?". Is there any advantage to being able to formulate sentences of the type, "Type A of violence seems to be the cause of type B, which again seems to be a cause of either type A or type C"? In other words, is there any advantage to making the theory of violence relatively self-contained in the sense that a major part of the theory of violence can be formulated (mainly) using types of violence as basic elements?

The answer seems partly to be yes, at least in the sense that it may be worth trying. The idea of unifying so apparently disparate phenomena as falling apples and planets under the concepts of bodies, with mass - including also liquid bodies such as water - made relations that had not been obvious before more transparent (e.g. relating to the law of gravitation). Research is also some kind of a game: "here are the elements I am going to use, let me see how far they can bring me in gaining deeper insights starting with the relations among them alone". This principle is as useful as a heuristic as it becomes dangerous as a dogma: "I am only going to use these elements".

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What has been said so far essentially boils down to the following: the definition of violence has to be related to the typology of violence, and the typology of violence has to be related to the kind of theory one has/tries to create of violence. This can be done explicitly: if not, it is usually built into the thought structure implicitly - often to the surprise of the users of definitions and typologies, when they are made aware of it. The degree of explicitness is important in research activity although the capacity of any single researcher to see the assumptions on which his thought system is built will always be relatively limited.

Hence there may be some point to conceptualizing violence in such a way that it provides a basis for a rich, self-contained theory. On the other hand, there is the first criterion mentioned above: the phenomena brought together under that heading must also have something very basic in common. As a point of departure one might say that this "something basic" is destruction: at a higher level of abstraction may be the formulation "anything avoidable that impedes human self-realization" might be used. It should be noted though that the latter is anthropocentric as a concept: it excludes violence done to non-human life, to matter, perhaps also to the man-made environment - hence it limits the concept. That limitation, however, we are going to accept to start with - as human beings we should be granted a certain right to be particularly motivated to understand the conditions of our own destruction.

But if we now are at least relatively free to choose our definition and typology, do we not reduce the whole exercise to a play on and with words? Not quite, for the simple reason that we have two perspectives to guide us. According to the first one, violence as a concept shall make our social reality transparent in significant directions, making us capture a certain set of important phenomena. According to the second one, the types of violence should be useful as a basis for theory-formation. These are two different criteria, and the basic meta-criterion is whether they are compatible, in other words, whether they lead to a very high level of overlap. If not, some mutual adjustment will have to take place. [2]

In this entire exercise, however, we have to proceed with some care for the very simple reason that "violence" is a highly emotional term, and it is so because it refers to highly important phenomena, to express it mildly. Most people would probably agree that as a concept it unifies at least such disparate phenomena as wars, internal and external, torture, homicide, etc. Violence is generally seen

as bad, as something to be rejected, to reduce, to get rid of. That immediately opens for two possible pitfalls:

- excluding from the definition of violence anything one does not reject
- including under the definition of violence anything one does reject

What does one do about that?

Essentially the answer would be that this touches on the general area of researcher psychology and motivation, and research should be judged on its own terms; it is the result that counts, not the motivation. In doing this evaluation it would certainly be wise to keep those two pitfalls in mind, relating the research product to the cultural, national, class and (less interesting) personal basis out of which it was produced. [3]

2. The negative approach: some typologies to be rejected

Let us now proceed by looking at some typologies that are not to be recommended, at least not according to the principles enunciated above: to what extent does the definition call our attention to a basic similarity between disparate phenomena, and to what extent does the typology permit us to formulate interesting hypotheses about the relations between the types?

Two typologies, probably the best known ones, would be

aggressive vs. defensive violence
intended vs. unintended violence

giving rise to some kind of ranking of forms of violence, starting with the "worst" forms:

- (1) intended, aggressive violence
- (2) unintended, aggressive violence
- (3) intended, defensive violence

ruling out the fourth combination as relatively meaningless. Given that "violence" somehow has to do with destruction this typology focuses the attention on "who started"

and the relation between the actor and the violent act - whether the actor wanted, evaluated positively, in advance, the destruction.

We have chosen these two dichotomies as examples in order to illustrate the point that in any typology a paradigm including some perspectives and excluding others is already implicit. For something to be "started" there has to be nothing of it before: in other words, violence is conceived of as an event rather than as something more permanent with no clear beginning, perhaps no clear end either. Further, for something to be "intended" there has to be somebody who intends, who wills the violent act, presumably the actor - possibly acting through others. But this means that violence is related to the idea of an actor, who may or may not intend the act - there has to be an actor somewhere.

Both positions are dramatic, as is seen very clearly when one adds their negations:

Table 1. A first typology

	Violence as <u>event</u>	Violence as <u>permanent</u>
Violence as <u>action</u>	Type I	Type II
Violence as <u>non-action</u>	Type III	Type IV

Type I then is what might be referred to as "classical violence", and it is only within that type that the two dichotomies aggressive vs. defensive and intended vs. unintended really make sense. I shall refer to it as personal or direct violence, preferring the latter term since "personal" limits the type of thinking to the level of inter-personal violence. Correspondingly, Type IV would be the pure case of structural violence, for if there is no actor, yet a permanent state of violence that cannot be said to be natural (in the sense of being "unavoidable") the violence must be somehow built into the social structure. ^[4] Types II and III then are intermediate types: in Type II that permanent state of affairs (e.g. keeping people below subsistence level) is maintained deliberately, and in Type III the structure hits suddenly, e.g. in the form of traffic accidents.

Let us now go back to the two dichotomies that gave rise to Type I, and hence, indirectly, to the four types given above. In what direction do those two dichotomies steer our thinking about violence? Obviously, it focuses the attention on the worst case, the aggressor, in the sense of the party initiating intended, aggressive violence. Thus, the concept narrows in on the actor, it is oriented towards the subjects rather than the objects of violence, the actors rather than the victims, possibly focusing on the guilt and motivation of the actors rather than on the domain and scope of the destruction of the victims.

Thus within this subject-oriented perspective the focus is on he who throws the first stone and the question is naturally whether it was intended, and if yes - why? Since the perspective on violence is actor-oriented, research would then tend to zoom in on the characteristics of the aggressive actor, i.e. qualities that can operate at the level of the actor. If the actor is a person the search might be for roots of violence in his or her bio-history or psychic history, or it may be directed towards biological aggression. In other words, the perspective can be specific to that particular actor and/or more general, to all actors of that type - but the cause is located inside the actor.^[5] Thus, an actor-oriented perspective at the inter-societal level may be combined with a structure-oriented perspective at the inter-class level - as in the idea that international aggression is linked to internal contradictions, e.g. of a capitalist (or revisionist) society. But this is too narrow as a focus, it does not also steer the attention towards relations between the actors as a possible cause of violence; even as violence in and by itself.

Let us then look at two other well-known but also unsatisfactory approaches. They are more neutral where the first criterion is concerned since they are only concerned with typology-formation, not with definition of violence, but not neutral/useful where theory-formation is concerned.

The first is a division that played a certain role in the early days of peace research, between violence (or peace, conflict, etc.) as conceived of by the psychologist, the social psychologist, the sociologist, the economist, the anthropologist, the political scientist, the international relationist, the historian, the specialist in international law, the criminologist, the military man, etc. Here there is a confusion between what may be a useful process for exploring a concept (bringing all these people together to see what comes out of it) and a useful typology. It is quite possible that one might capture, through this method,

a broad spectrum of types of violence - at least of different views and schools, not only different disciplines are articulated. But the types do not serve the second purpose. From the circumstance that two types of violence differ in the sense that one is the concern of discipline A and the other of discipline B (e.g. war and criminal violence in the sense of domestic law) it does not follow anything about their usefulness in sentences of the type, "Type A relates to type B in the following manner ---" - except that it would be very strange if anything useful at all could come out of this typology. Hence we would be inclined to regard it as the lowest level possible, to be rejected offhand: it is a typology of social sciences (and even as such not a good one, merely reflecting some historical traditions and peculiar circumstances), not of violence.^[6]

The second is a more advanced typology that has played and plays a considerable role, not entirely unrelated to the preceding one, but more sophisticated, in terms of level of social organization at which the violence is expressed. The typology can be presented as a simple polytomy:

intra-personal

inter-personal

inter-group (with inter-class as a special case)

inter-societal (with inter-national as a special case)

violence. Here it may be argued that the inclusion of "intra-personal violence" is dubious: is there such a thing? "Intra-personal conflict" is relatively unproblematic as a concept, but "intra-personal violence"? We would argue in favour of its inclusion, particularly given the approach to violence as anything avoidable that impedes human self-realization, or "personal growth" if one prefers that term. There is such a thing as destructive intra-personal processes, and they are certainly not necessarily willed by the person.

However, the example is chosen also because it shows the relation between conceptualization and typology-formation: the moment we include that type we can formulate some basic sets of hypotheses, e.g.

the fundamental cause of all violence is intra-personal violence;
the others derive from that

the fundamental cause of all violence is inter-class violence;
the others derive from that

The two formulations make most sense if the word ⁿ conflict ^h is used instead of "violence", unless violence is defined in such a way that it also encompasses certain forms of conflict in more latent form (as will be done later). Obviously, the two statements above can be exemplified through (vulgar) freudianism and marxism respectively.

Hence we are here dealing with a typology that permits theory-formation relating the levels vertically, but it does not facilitate any horizontal theory-formation, relating types of violence at the same level since it makes no distinctions between types at the same level. Typically the typology does not exclude or forbid such exercises, but since it does not point in that direction it does not provide any help either, and that is the reason why it should be rejected, except as an auxiliary typology. The theories formulated with it would tend to be reductionist, placing the causal burden on one level at the expense of the others, and that is too dramatic epistemologically: there seems to be insufficient basis for such simplifying assumptions.

Rather, far from rejecting the idea of level and cross-level isomorphisms and causal chains one must also be open to the idea of single-level, sui generis violence where one type may be seen, fruitfully, as being caused by another type at the same level. It might also be pointed out that vertical theories of the types mentioned, with a single-level emphasis, can be seen as power strategies used by the specialists in one or more of the social science disciplines operating at that level, thereby trying to maximize their own relevance, presenting themselves as specialists in the roots and causes of all types of violence. Having said that one should then immediately hasten to add that this also applies to the peace researcher and violence researcher who goes in for a more symmetric multi-level approach, thereby maximizing his own relevance as a generalist, presumably capable not only of formulating theories at any level, but also of formulating hypotheses about relations between levels.

3. The positive approach: some suggestions

We shall now proceed, taking as point of departure the idea of violence as "anything avoidable that impedes human self-realization". We shall interpret "human self-realization", in turn, ^{as} satisfaction of human needs, and make use of the following list:

Table 2. basic needs, material and non-material

<u>Category</u>	<u>Needs and/or rights</u>	<u>Goods</u>
Survival	{ <u>Individual</u> : against accident, homicide { <u>Collective</u> : against attack, war	SECURITY
Physiological	{ <u>Input</u> : nutrition, air, water, sleep { <u>Output</u> : movement, excretion	FOOD, WATER
Ecological	{ <u>Climatic</u> : protection against climate { <u>Somatic</u> : protection against disease, health	CLOTHES, SHELTER MEDICATION
Social	{ <u>Community</u> : love, sex, offspring { <u>Culture</u> : self-expression, dialogue, education	SCHOOLING
Freedom	{ Right to travel and be travelled to { Rights of expression and impression	(TRANSPORTATION) (COMMUNICATION)
Politics	{ Rights of consciousness-formation { Rights of mobilization { Rights of confrontation	(MEETINGS, MEDIA) (PARTIES) (ELECTIONS)
Legal	{ Rights of due process of law	(COURTS, etc.)
Work	{ Right to work { Need for creativity, self-expression in work	(JOBS)
Relation to society	{ Need for understanding the conditions of one's own life { Need for activity, for being subject, not only object, client { Need for unprogrammed time, for new experience - also intellectual, aesthetic	

Relation to others	{ Need for togetherness, belongingness, { friendship, solidarity, support
Relation to self	{ Need for well-being, happiness, joy { Need for self-actuation, realizing potentials { Need for a meaning with life, a sense of purpose
Relation to nature	{ Need for access to nature { Need for some kind of partnership with nature

There is hardly any limit to the number of comments that could be given to this list, most of them critical - but that will be by-passed in this context [7] (For instance, there is also some mention of the material or institutional components used to satisfy needs for some of those needs - and the problem of whether they really serve that purpose). The list nevertheless serves our purpose: to give an image of what can be meant by "doing damage to man". In each case it can be argued that if the need is not satisfied, then there will either be some kind of human disintegration (somatic for the first cases, human for the social needs) or there will, in general, sooner or later be some kind of social disintegration simply because the failure to satisfy the needs may lead to revolts. Some of these needs are even referred to as rights in the list since they have been crystallized into the human rights tradition, precisely, it seems because people have tended to fight for them. However, we have also added, at the end, ten needs of a more ephemeral character: we think they are basic, but they constitute neither a conditio sine qua non for continued individual existence, nor for continuation of the social order - unless one builds them into the definitions of human and social "system maintenance".

In the Table there are three dividing lines that divide the list into four parts, corresponding to four types of violence when the needs are not satisfied:

"Classical" violence

Poverty - deprivation of basic material needs

Repression - deprivation of human rights

Alienation - deprivation of higher needs

Let us now start by defending the inclusion of all four.

The first category includes sudden bodily destruction at the hands of some actor who intends to exercise violence, in other words direct violence to the human body. It might also include psychological violence: the English word "hurt" carries both meanings.

To proceed to the second category all that is needed is to ask the question (of the preceding paragraph) why there has to be an identifiable actor for something to be defined as violence - violence can be done to the human body in other ways as well. That opens for the first category of structural violence: structurally conditioned poverty.

To proceed to the third category all that is needed is to ask the question why this violence necessarily has to be done to the human body to be characterized as violence - why not also include violence done to the human mind, psyche or how one wants to express it. That opens for the second category of structural violence: structurally conditioned repression - or "repressive intolerance".

To proceed to the fourth category all that is needed is to ask why the violence has to be of the kind associated with repressive regimes (and declared to be infraction of human rights in important documents) when there are other types of damage done to the human mind not included in that particular tradition. That opens for the third category of structural violence; structurally conditioned alienation or "repressive tolerance" - for it is repressive but also compatible with a low level of structural violence of the second type, repression as such.

One might now go on and ask one more basic question: why all this anthropocentrism, why not also include violence done unto nature, and thereby open for the possible inclusion of ecological destruction under the general heading of violence. However, we shall not do so in this context, except for the indication just given.

Thus violence has been defined in terms of what kind of damage it does to man; in other words, a clearly victim-oriented approach. But what about the actor, have we not hidden the circumstance that just as sudden death can be built into the structure (the traffic accidents, for instance) poverty, repression and alienation may be the consequences of deliberate action of somebody? And does this not mean that the dichotomy direct/structural developed in the preceding section actually cuts across the four types just given, yielding a total of eight?

Strictly speaking, yes. In practice, however, we feel that the cases just mentioned are so exceptional that it is justified to identify direct violence with the first type in Table 2, and structural violence with the other three. This is particularly true because the mechanisms seem to be about the same for all three types of structural violence:

exploitation (vertical division of labour)

autonomy

fragmentation

marginalization

These are short-hand formulations for complex matters in economic, social and political orders that have, precisely, such consequences as shortage of nutrition, lack of freedom, lack of togetherness, deprivation of well-being in general - without saying, in any way, that these are necessary, or sufficient conditions in a strict sense. Hence we shall stick to the idea of identifying the first type with direct violence and the next three with structural violence - with interesting and important

geo-political distribution patterns in the world today. Thus, whereas the first type is a shared concern all over the world, one might hypothesize that the geography of poverty coincides with the geography of the periphery of world capitalism; repression is a widespread category except for some of the smaller, liberal, capitalist countries and alienation is above all a shared characteristic of industrial countries.

Having said this, let us now try another test of this concept of violence: the negation test. The negation of violence is, in a trivial sense, absence of violence; in a broader sense it is "peace". Since this is the key term in "peace research", it is obvious that peace researchers have a stake in how it is conceptualized. A general observation of the present author would be that not many researchers today seem content to conceive of peace as the absence of classical violence alone; something should be added to that condition. The term "peace" has a rich etymology; it is probably only in the Western culture, and only recently, that it is trivialized in the direction of "absence of large-scale violence between states" (which, perhaps, could be referred to as "warlessness" or as "armistice"). Typically, this is an elitist concept, reflecting only adverse conditions affecting elites - elites generally do not suffer from poverty, repression and alienation to the same extent as do non-elites (whereas war is a more shared condition). To designate as peace a state rampant with poverty, repression and alienation, however, is a travesty on the concept of peace.

The negation of violence, defined as

Violence = "classical" violence or poverty or repression or alienation

would be

(Peace =) absence of "classical" violence and absence of poverty
and absence of repression and absence of alienation

in other words, some kind of utopian condition. Peace, as goal-setting, should have this property; it should be a rich concept, not necessarily easily obtainable (e.g. by paper accords and signatures).

Let us then proceed to the other criterion: the feasibility of theory-formation. To engage in that the concept of direct violence has to be sub-divided, too, and just as for structural violence a division into three types seems useful:

Vertical direct violence directed against the top,

"revolutionary violence", fight for liberation;
in other words
direct counter-violence

Vertical direct violence directed against the bottom,

counter-revolutionary violence, violence of oppression;
in other words
direct counter-counter violence

Horizontal violence, which does not take place within a
vertical structure.

Having said this, one may now build on a classical adage in peace thinking: the idea that violence breeds violence. Usually, this is taken to mean that

(I) Direct (horizontal) violence leads to Direct (horizontal) violence
(and, as a corollary, that "preparations for direct violence lead to preparations for direct violence" - a basis for one of the two major trends in the theory of arms races, the actio-reactio school). But the failure of this structure - blind, verticality - ignorant theorem to capture the most significant events of our times is one major source of motivation for the typology presented in the present paper.

Thus, using the extension to structural violence we get

(II) Structural violence leads to Direct counter-violence leads to Direct counter-counterviolence which serves as a much better guide to the present world. The first theorem merely directs the attention to certain features of the "East-West conflict"; the second to many features of the "North-South conflict": its structural origin, the wars of national liberation, and the counter-revolutionary efforts. It also follows from the general idea, as hypotheses, that structural violence in the form of repression and alienation will also, sooner or later, lead to direct counter-violence, one way or the other. In all cases there may be revolts, efforts at liberation - and then oppressive counter-violence in order to protect the structure of status quo with such means as counter-insurgency, torture, etc.. But the idea can also be used the other way.

(III) Direct (Horizontal) violence leads to Structural violence

Wars of conquest can be used to set up structures that have the effects indicated in Table 2. And these structures, then, are characterized by exploitation, penetration, fragmentation and/or marginalization. Operated internationally, and built around economic dimensions this translates into capitalist imperialism: a

division of labour between the producers of raw materials and manufactures, the penetration of the periphery by means of bridgeheads, the fragmentation of the periphery into countries with little interaction among them (and the countries into districts, and into economic sectors with low levels of interrelation), and exclusion of the periphery from participation in the real centres of decision-making. [9]

And having said all this, one may also include the fourth possibility:

(IV) Structural violence leads to Structural violence

Thus, poverty may lead to repression and repression to alienation, sometimes via interludes of vertical direct violence. These relations are less explored; but typologies should also point to possibilities that have not, so far, been the subject of much investigation.

Imagine now that one combines all these "equations" into a story which runs about as follows: direct violence was used to establish structural violence, then there was direct counter-violence (to destroy that structure), counter-revolutionary violence set in but was defeated, the net result being a new actor capable of exercising direct violence, also establishing successive types of structural violence, and increased capacity for direct violence which, in turn, lead to increased capacity for direct violence on the other side - and so on. All four partial theorems are here combined into something that when elaborated might read like the history of a part of our century in the North Atlantic part of the world. The point is that this can all be formulated in terms of the (very few) concepts so far presented. Of course, it says nothing about the mechanisms or means of direct violence, the nature of the military hard- and soft-ware, but in a sense that belongs to the trivia of peace studies. More important is the effort to conceptualize chains of violence of the type indicated, providing more depth and more extension to the old saying "violence breeds violence".

But if violence breeds violence, where does the "first violence" come from or, differently phrased, what is at the roots of the violence? Perhaps there is something very Western in this question, in the idea of tracing things back to some identifiable "roots", to a first mover. Obviously, what came first, direct or structural violence, is a chicken-and-egg problem: unless one assumes that there was once an ideal state without any form of violence (Paradise), and then came the Fall, either with the first major act of direct violence (like Cain slaying Abel) or a first major case of structural violence (like division of labour emerging after a state of primitive communism).

Even without such cosmological assumptions, however, the question is meaningful, and, broadly speaking, three classes of answers may be indicated.

The first approach could be classified as horizontal theory in the sense discussed in the preceding paragraph, simply remaining content with the cycles indicated above, each one operating on its own level. Each case of violence, between persons, groups and societies would be explained in terms of another case of violence at the same level. The causal chains should be constructed as hypotheses with a very open mind: direct violence may be followed by direct or structural violence, structural violence by direct or structural violence (of any kind), and so on. This, then, can be done at the global and/or domestic levels - and will, in general, lead to a relatively high level of insight.

The second approach could be classified as vertical theory, theory formation across levels. There are very important theories in this category, e.g. the idea of displacement or projection of intra-social violence to the inter-social level. There is a marxist version of this idea: that domestic structural violence in the form of the contradictions in capitalist formations lead to direct violence abroad in order to get new sources of raw materials and new markets, or to efforts to obtain the same by setting up, by various means (technical assistance, war reparations, etc.) international structures with the mechanisms of structural violence already built into them. In other words, capitalism at home leads to imperialism abroad, and the Chinese extension of that dictum: revisionism at home leads to social imperialism abroad. According to this view of violence both are tantamount to aggression, although of a type poorly understood by international law.

And there is the liberal version, the idea that leaders try to deflect social energy that may go into domestic direct violence, directed against them, onto the international level by engaging in "adventures" abroad, whether of the direct or structural variety - or both. No doubt these vertical theories are important, and we hope to have shown that they are considerably enriched when the concept of violence is extended so as to include structural violence, perhaps particularly by including the concept of structural aggression [C]

What about reversing these vertical theories? Can direct violence, or the threat of direct violence at the international level lead to structural violence domestically? It certainly can; this is where the whole theory of the garrison state enters the study of violence. A country prepares for large-scale direct violence, as

aggressor and even as defender, and has to engage in certain structural rearrangements internally in order to create a society more isomorphic to the structure of a modern army where economic, political and cultural life are concerned. In doing so there may also be bursts of direct violence in either direction.

And, correspondingly: a country embedded in structural violence, e.g. capitalist or social imperialism internationally will usually have to reproduce that structure internally. If it is in the periphery of the structure there will, generally speaking, be bridgehead formation of one kind or the other leading to (or making use of) steep vertical gradients inside the country. If it is in the centre, however, there is also the possibility that structural violence globally is served by a low level of structural violence internally, using structures characterized by high levels of mass political participation and well distributed welfare to create societies that are less torn by internal conflict, and hence more able to mobilize the entire population in the effort to preserve the global structure. But the country may also have the periphery on the inside, Third World pockets in the midst of plenty (the African, American Indian and Chicano elements in the United States, for instance), in which case structural violence globally may very well lead to direct violence domestically. In short, the general idea is relatively rich in implications.

The third approach is also, strictly speaking, some kind of vertical theory, but it is of a different kind. It is the old search for the roots of violence "in the minds of men", or in their bodies, biologically embedded. This is where aggression theories of instinct or territorial varieties, etc. would enter the picture. No doubt, this leads outside the concept of violence as defined here: outside the formula "violence breeds violence". But there is one lead to be taken from the extension of the idea of violence to include structural violence: if the search is for something more innate it should not only be for the roots of direct violence, but also for the roots of structural violence - for instincts/drives/inclinations towards domination as well as destruction.

This is not the place to go into reasons for accepting or rejecting this type of thinking. What should be pointed out, however, is that there are obvious links between this type of approach to the question of where violence comes from and vertical theory: the conditioning theory and the trigger theory [12]

According to the conditioning theory man is born tabula rasa where violence is concerned; but certain structures or experiences may build into him violent inclinations (of either kind), condition him so to speak. Living in a society replete with structural violence, or direct violence, conditions him through learning: what he sees around him is destruction and domination, he learns either type of behaviour and internalizes them as normal. Sometimes he is even given double exposure because violence is presented in a concentrated, "telescoped" fashion through the mass media.

According to the trigger theory inclinations toward destruction and/or domination are latent and may be triggered into action by special external stimuli, some of which - if not all - may be classified as belonging to the categories of direct and structural violence. The most non-violent, non-domineering person may turn into an aggressor in both senses of that term when exposed ^{to} sufficiently high levels of direct or structural violence.

These two theories may be said to differ in the same way as the major approaches to linguistic behaviour: according to the former man is neutral but programmes of violence may be built into him through learning from the environment; according to the latter man is already programmed in the direction of violence of either type. According to the former he can develop in any direction; according to the latter man has some kind of "original sin" imprinted on his mind, as a birth-mark.

According to the former he is seen more as being malleable, a product of environmental factors, including conditioning by elites - for good and for bad; according to the latter man's character is more firm and less manipulable. According to the former the basic cause is still with the structure; according to the latter the roots of violence are deeper, possibly non-eradicable (although they can be maintained at a latent level). The difference is important: the former view may be used to justify direct violence to end structural violence and power to "experts" in structural transformation, leading - or so they promise - to non-violent structures; the latter view may be used to justify either kind of violence as a defence against direct violence, since it is an indelible part of the human condition. Thus, both views may lead to, or be compatible with, the use of direct violence to end war and exploitation; and both may lead to new forms of structural violence. May: peace research is the study not only of violence but also of how to overcome violence with non-violent means, e.g. non-military defence and non-violent revolution. [13]

The basic difference, however, is that the latter view often leads to inactivity and fatalism and the former to some type of action, the idea being that structures are easier to change than human action. It is easy to see, from what has been presented in this paper, what kind of action that would be: efforts to

overcome exploitation through equity and/or self-reliance

overcome penetration through autonomy (and self-reliance)

overcome fragmentation through solidarity

overcome marginalization through participation

Translated into more concrete terms this means work towards some kind of world where each part is a centre, and where a great range of the needs in Table 2 are satisfied [14]

Possibly, this points towards a world where a high number of relatively small, autonomous, and relatively self-reliant units are tied together in a network of global interdependencies. In such a world, the four mechanisms of structural violence might be counteracted, even to some extent eliminated. And in such a world the fundamental hypothesis could be tested: is it true that if these mechanisms are negated, then structures are no longer violent, leading to endless chains of structural and direct violence? Or, could it be like for direct violence, that if the mechanisms or instruments of direct violence, called arms (in a broad sense, including the social organization of the army) are eliminated, then they only reappear in some other form - (because nothing has been done to the conflict formation built into the structure)? In other words, is man violent, at least to some extent, under any condition? Or, would the answer be that we have not yet succeeded in identifying all the mechanisms of structural violence?

4. Conclusion

With that question we prefer to stop. The point is not what the answer might be (we certainly do not know), but that it is possible to formulate the question with the typology used. If the reader will permit a mixture of three languages: the problematique is fassbar, and that is the minimum one should request, not an answer. Of course, this is nothing surprising since the typology has been constructed not only with a view to complying with the first criterion, but also keeping the second criterion in mind. The rationale of the definition and the typology would be based on the contention that both criteria are met at the same time - to a fair extent. And that was the goal of the entire exercise.

N O T E S

1. This is the formulation used in my "Violence, Peace and Peace Research", Essays in Peace Research, Vol. I, pp.109-134.
2. Thus, the types of violence used to make us see things as similar shall also be types of violence that can be used in theory formation so that a relatively self-contained theory of violence becomes possible.
3. Norwegians, for instance, probably having an exceptionally high identification with nature, might be more prone to include destructive acts exercised on non-human nature, for instance mountains, as violence.
4. Johan Galtung, op.cit. p. 113.
5. Or, more correctly expressed: the violence is not actor-invariant; it depends at least to some extent on the particular characteristics of the actor.
6. When definitions of violence are made within the traditions of different social sciences concepts used will usually differ, which in itself would be a good reason why the types of violence as conceived by the different social sciences would not easily tie in with each other.
7. See Galtung et al. Measuring World Development, World Indicators Program No.2, and Johan Galtung & Anders Wirak, Human Needs, Human Rights and the Theory of Development, World Indicators Program No.10 - both from the Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo, 1974 and 1976.
8. The other trend being the Eigendynamik idea, that the source of arms races is found within the country itself; a tradition particularly associated with the many excellent studies carried out by Dieter Senghaas.
9. See, for instance, Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism", Journal of Peace Research, 1971, pp.81-117; also to appear in Essays of Peace Research, Vol. IV.
10. For an effort in this direction, see Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression", Journal of Peace Research, 1964, pp.95-119, and Johan Galtung, A Structural Theory of Revolutions, (Rotterdam University Press, 1974).
11. For an effort to compare capitalist and social imperialism see Johan Galtung, Social Imperialism and Sub-Imperialism: Continuities in the Structural Theory of Imperialism, (Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo), 1975.
12. For an effort to analyse this problem, see Johan Galtung, "Is Peace Possible?", Essays in Peace Research, Vol. I (Copenhagen, Christian Ejlers, 1975), pp.140-149.

13. See Johan Galtung, The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective, (North-Holland, 1976; sections 4.3 and 5.3)
14. For a UN document using this type of wording, see the Cocoyoc Declaration of 1974.